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ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR
AMENDMENTS OF 1970
The protection and enhancement of the quality of the nation's air
resources is a primary goal of the federal Clean Air Act.- Due, however,
to the Act's failure to foster aggressive state or federal programs, 2 progress
toward achieving this goal was disappointingly slow before 1970. 3 Con-
gress, spurred on by public environmental concern, attempted to correct
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1) (1970). The Clean Air Act was originally enacted
as the Air Pollution Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322, as amended, Act of
June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162, and Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-761, 76 Stat. 760. This Act was superseded by the Clean Air Act of
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, as amended, Air Quality Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, and Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
2. Under the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107(c), 81 Stat.
491, the federal government was required to publish criteria by which the states
were to set air quality standards. The Act failed to provide the power to insure
compliance with state standards; no time-tables for achievement existed; and
the federal government's enforcement efforts were limited to interstate violations
unless action on intrastate matters was expressly requested by the governor of
that state, id. § 108(g) (2), 81 Stat. 496, or an emergency situation required fed-
eral involvement, id. § 108(k), 81 Stat. 497. When it could act, the federal en-
forcement process was a long and complex system of conferences and hearings
through which, to date, only one case has been fully litigated. See United States
v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904
(1970). See generally I F. GRAD, TREATiSE oN ENvmoNmENTAL LAw § 2.03,
at 2-87 to -94 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GRAD].
The weaknesses and enforcement problems of the Air Quality Act of 1967
were recognized by both houses of Congress. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 21 (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. RzP. No. 1196]; H.R. REP. No. 1146,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970). Six factors were identified in the House Report
as the basis of the "regrettably slow" progress under the Air Quality Act of
1967, including "cumbersome and time consuming procedures . . .[,] organiza-
tional problems on the federal level where air pollution control has not been
accorded a sufficiently high priority, . . . and failure [of the federal agency] to
demonstrate sufficient aggressiveness in implementing present law." Id. For a
general discussion of the Clean Air Act see Trumbull, Federal Control of Sta-
tionary Sources Air Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283 (1972).
3. "A review of achievements to date, however, make [sic] abundantly clear that
the strategies which we have pursued . . . have been inadequate . . . and the
methods employed in implementing those strategies often have been slow and
less effective than they might have been." H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1970). See S. RlP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 1-4; Hearings on S. 3229,
S. 3466, S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
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this weakness by enacting the Glean Air Amendments of 1970 (Glean Air
Amendments) .4 These amendments were designed to increase dramatically
direct federal involvement in air pollution contro5 and pressure the states
to develop effective enforcement programs through the establishment of
national air quality standards,' attainment deadlines,7 and federal review
of mandatory state implementation plans." To insure the aggressiveness of
this expanded federal role, the amendments establish strict guidelines for
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 125-26 (1970) [herein-
after cited as 1970 Senate Hearings] (remarks of Senator Randolph, Chairman,
Senate Comm. on Public Works).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857b-1, 1857c-5,
-8 to -10, 1857d-1, 1857f-1, -6e to -7, 1857h-5, 18571 (Supp. IV, 1974).
5. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: (1) require EPA to establish na-
tional standards of performance for new stationary sources, which are to rcflect
the "degree of emission . . . reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated," id. § 1857c-6(a)(1) (1970); (2) require EPA to list and
set separate national standards for hazardous air pollutants, id. § 1857c-7(b);
(3) allow the Administrator to independently issue federal compliance orders or
file suit, regardless of the intrastate characteristics of the violator, id. § 1857c-8(a)
(1). Also, if the Administrator feels the state has failed to properly enforce its
plan, he can intervene and enforce it. Id. § 1857c-8(a) (2); cf. Air Quality
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108 (c) (4), 81 Stat. 493.
6. The Administrator of EPA is required to establish national primary (to
protect public health) and secondary ambient air standards (to protect the
public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with
the presence of such air pollutants). 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970). These repre-
sent minimum standards and states are free to establish stricter standards. Id.
§ 1857d-1, as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). The establishment of national
standards reflects "the insight that all air pollution affects interstate commerce
and that the impact of emissions from stationary sources cannot be limited by
local or state regulation alone." GRAD, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 2-77.
7. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 provide that the primary standard
should be attained as "expeditiously as practicable" but (subject to allowable
variances) no later than three years from the date of approval of the implemen-
tation plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (i) (1970). The secondary standard
is to be met in a "reasonable time." Id. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (A) (ii).
8. Each state is required to develop a plan for implementing both the national
primary and secondary standards. Id. § 1857c-5(a) (1). This plan is to be
reviewed by the Administrator, and approval is based on compliance with the
guidelines outlined in the statute. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (requiring that an
implementation plan include emission limitations, monitoring systems, adequate
provisions for intergovernmental cooperation, and periodic public reports). If
a state fails to develop an implementation plan, the Administrator has the power
to intervene, prescribe and enforce an implementation plan. Id. § 1857c-5 (c),
as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
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CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
administrative review of state implementation plans9 and provide for
citizens' suits."
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)1 petitioners brought suit" challenging the ap-
proval by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
of Georgia's air pollution control implementation plan. 13 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Administrator of EPA
exceeded his authority under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 in
approving provisions of the Georgia plan that: (1) guaranteed trade
secret information connected with emission data would be kept con-
fidential; (2) stipulated a pollution control strategy based solely on
dispersal techniques; (3) allowed Georgia officials to consider economic
impact and technical feasibility in developing and promulgating their
implementation plan; and (4) allowed Georgia officials to grant vari-
ances from particular requirements of such a plan.'- The Supreme
9. Congress specifically provided statutory guidelines at each critical point
in the Administrator's promulgation of standards and review of state implemen-
tation plans. Id. §§ 1857c-4, -5(a)(2), (e), (f). Congress also provided for
prompt judicial review (directly by the United States Court of Appeals) of
these administrative decisions. Id. § 1857h-5(b)(1), as amended, (Supp IV,
1974). See generally GRAD, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 2-75. In establishing the
above provisions, Congress rejected alternative bills which would have granted
the Administrator much broader discretion. See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note
3, at 24-46.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). This provision provides that "any person,"
without regard to amount in controversy or diversity requirements, may bring
suit in federal district court against anyone, including the federal government,
who is an alleged violator of emission standards or limitations, or against the
Administrator of EPA for failure to perform his duties under the Act. Id.
§ 1857h-2(a). Sixty days notice to the appropriate state or federal agency is
required before any action can be initiated. Id. § 1857b-2(b). This notice
requirement has been viewed by some as an attempt to alert EPA to the
existence of a problem and to allow it time to act before actual litigation has
been initiated. See GRAD, supra note 2, § 2.03, at 2-137 to -140.
11. 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part sub nom. Train v. NRDC,
421 U.S. 60 (1975).
12. Pursuant to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5
(b) (1) (1970), conferring jurisdiction for direct suit in the appropriate court
of appeals, suit was brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(NRDC), Save America's Vital Environment (SAVE), and two private citizens.
489 F,2d at 393.
13. The Administrator approved Georgia's implementation plan. 40 C.F.R.
. 52.572 (1974). This plan is the Georgia Air Quality Control Act, GA. CODE
AN'N. §§ 88-901 to -917 (1971), as amended, §§ 88-903, -906, -906.1, -908,
-909 (Supp. 1975).
14. 489 F.2d at 393-94.
1975]
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Court, in Train v. NRDC Is reversed the Fifth Circuit on the issue of
variances and held that states could grant variances if attainment and
maintenance of the national ambient air quality standards are not
threatened."0
The state statute before the Fifth Circuit was the Georgia Air Quality
Control Act.' 7 This statute required that "any information relating to
secret processes [or] devices" obtained by the State in the course of its
air pollution regulation shall be kept confidential. 18 The court of appeals
found the broad nature of this provision to be in conflict with the federal
requirement of full disclosure of emission data.29 Full disclosure is critical
to an effective public role in air pollution control,20 which, in turn, is es-
sential to aggressive enforcement of the federal law.2' Both the courts
15. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
16. Id. at 98-99.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. GA. Corm ANN. § 88-908 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975). This pro-
vision also applies to secret methods of manufacture or production. Violation
of this section is a misdemeanor, id. § 88-916, thus further pressuring state officials
not to disclose such information.
19. 489 F.2d at 397-98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a)(2)(F)(ii), (iv) (1970),
provide for state assurances that "periodic reports on the nature and amounts
of [stationary source] emissions" will be made and that these reports will "be
available at reasonable times for public inspection."
20. Congress realized that the citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1875h-2
(1970), (see note 10 supra) could be effective only through full disclosure
of emission data. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 38. Thus in the Act
Congress provided for emission data disclosures, even when trade secrets might
be affected. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-9(c) (1970). See also id. §§ 1857f-6, 1857h-5.
In NRDC v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit concluded that although the Act's state
implementation plan provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970), was not "similarly
explicit where information supplied to state officials is concerned, . . . there
[was] no reason to strike the balance differently in that context." 489 F.2d at
398. Trade secret provisions similar to the one in the Georgia statute raise the
potential for extensive litigation over access to emission data, which could
greatly increase litigation costs and cause delays, thereby deterring citizen suits.
Hearings on the Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970
Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 92 Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Implementation Hearings] (remarks of Richard Ayres, NRDC).
21. "To assure that Federal and State agencies aggressively pursue their
responsibilities and to supplement their capacities, the bill provides a right
of citizen action to seek enforcement of the provisions of the act." S. REP. No.
[Vol. 10:297
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and EPA itself recognize that provisions such as those in the Georgia
statute are illegal obstacles in the path of public participation.22
Georgia's pollution control strategy relied on a "tall stack" form of
dispersion enhancement.2 3 Petitioners argued that this state plan con-
flicted with the Clean Air Amendments' requirement that emission limita-
tions be the basis of any control strategy."4 The Fifth Circuit concluded
that emission limitation is the preferred method of contro2 5 and inter-
preted section 1857c-5(a) (2) (B), which specified the control strategy
1196, supra note 2, at 3. See generally GaD., supra note 2, § 2.03, at 2-133
to -140.
22. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1974) (New York
trade secret provision struck down for ambiguity and potential conflict with the
Clean Air Amendments); NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 885-86 (1st Cir. 1973)
(Rhode Island trade secret provision ruled invalid as a violation of the public
disclosure principle of the Clean Air Amendments).
On the same day that the Administrator approved the Georgia trade secret
provision, he rejected similar provisions in other states (without stating why
the Georgia plan was distinct). 40 C.F.R. § 52.572 (1974). Moreover, in re-
sponse to recent court decisions, EPA has reviewed all implementation plans,
disapproved disclosure limitations within such plans that conflict with public
availability of emission data as required by the Clean Air Amendments, 39 Fed.
Reg. 34,533-39 (1974), and proposed new regulations to guarantee public access
to emission data through a request process to the Regional EPA Administrator,
id. 34,572-73 (1974).
23. 489 F.2d at 394 n.2. Under a "tall stack" dispersion approach the
pollutants emitted into the air are controlled by the height of the stack. The taller
the stack, the greater volume of pollutants allowed. The objective of this
technique is not to reduce emissions, but to maintain an acceptable dilution level
of pollutants in the atmosphere, the theory being that the taller the stack the
greater the dilution.
24. Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1974). The Clean Air Amendments provide that a state implementation plan
may not be approved unless "it includes emission limitations, schedules, time-
tables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may
be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or secondary
standard, including, but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls."
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (B) (1970).
25. 489 F.2d at 406-08 (focusing on the overall purpose of the Clean Air
Amendments). See United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1959), for a
guideline on statutory interpretation. Examining sections concerning new stationary
source standards and extra-hazardous pollutants, the court concluded that they
expressly require emission reductions or standards to be the primary method of
control. 489 F.2d at 407. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6(a) (1), -7(b) (1) (B) (1970).
The court also found that when these and other provisions within the Clean Air
Amendments referred to the control method employed within § 1857c-5 (state im-
plementation plans), this method was characterized as emission standards. See id.
§ 1857c-6(d) (1). Furthermore, the court, noting that § 1857h-2(a) (1) (A) per-
mits citizen suits against any person alleged to be in violation of "an emission
1976]
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to be incorporated into state air quality implementation plans, to mean
that compliance with national standards is first to be attempted through
all available means of emission limitations before other methods are
employed.2 6 This interpretation does not restrict the state's freedom to
choose between the various methods of emission limitations, nor does
it prohibit the state from supplementing its primary control strategy with
a non-reduction method. Non-reduction methodology, however, is im-
proper as a primary control strategy unless it is the only means available
to meet the national standards within the deadlines. Both the court's
conclusion and its statutory interpretation are supported by the legis-
lative history of the Clean Air Amendments27 and, in part, by EPA's
own regulations 8
standard or limitation," stressed that if dispersion enhancement was a legal alterna-
tive to emission limitations in a state's control strategy, the state would be allowed
to escape the safeguard of the citizen suit provision. This result contradicts the
intent of Congress. 489 F.2d at 408.
26. 489 F.2d at 406-08.
27. Under the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107, 81 Stat.
485, 490-91, states were free to choose their own method of pollution control.
In the Clean Air Amendments, however, Congress required state air pollution
control through emission limitations and rejected two alternative bills which
did not require such methods. See S. 3466, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 24, 37 ("emission standards,
or equivalent measures, and such other measures as may be necessary to
assure achieving or preserving such standards of ambient air quality within a
reasonable time" (emphasis added)); H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4
(required that state plans be "consistent with the purposes of the Act insofar as
it assures achieving such standards of air quality within a reasonable time").
This provision of the House Bill was deleted in conference, and the Senate
version was adopted with minor changes. H.R. CONFERENCE REP. No. 1783,
91st Con., 2d Sess. 1, 45 (1970). See S. Rep. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 9-13.
Implementation Hearings, supra note 20, at 11-18 (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
See also id. at 265-70 (remarks of EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus that the
primary objective of a pollution control strategy is emission reduction).
28. Regulations provide that a state plan "shall set forth a control strategy
which shall provide for the degree of emission reduction necessary for attain-
ment and maintenance of such national standard[s]." 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(a) (1974).
It is evident, however, that this general statement is weakened by regulations
dealing specifically with control strategy. Section 51.13(e)(2)(iii) (control
strategy for sulfur oxides and particulate matter-primary pollutants of power
plants) provides that the implementation plan shall "show that application of
the control strategy will result in the degree of emission reduction indicated to
be necessary ... as modified by appropriate consideration of factors set forth
in subdivision (ii)' Id. § 51.13(e) (2) (ii) (emphasis added). These factors
[Vol. 10:297
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Moreover, the dispersion enhancement strategy proposed by the
Georgia statute ignored the principle of non-degradation implicit in the
federal law."5 Non-degradation means that a state must not allow the
present quality of the air to deteriorate, even if the air quality level is
above the national standards set by the Clean Air Amendments. 0 Dis-
persion enhancement methods do not attempt to reduce pollution but
rather seek to maintain a minimum dilution level by spreading the pol-
lutants over a larger area.31 Given the present saturation levels of the
atmosphere and the inefficiency of dispersion methodology, 2 the Georgia
include "topography, spatial distribution of emissions, [and] stack height." Id.
§ 51.13(e)(2)(ii). Therefore, while theoretically an emissions reduction is
required by the regulations, it is quite possible that the practical result could
be a control strategy consisting solely of dispersion enhancement techniques.
See note 23 supra.
29. This principle is inferred from the Act's purpose to "protect and enhance
the quality of the nation's air resources." 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b) (1970) (em-
phasis added). The policy of non-degradation has been recognized as an essen-
tial part of the Glean Air Act and Amendments by HEW, 1970 Senate Hearings,
supra note 3, at 131, 132-33 (remarks of HEW Secretary Finch), by Congress,
S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 11, and by the courts, Fri v. Sierra Club,
412 U.S. 541 (1973), aff'g by an equally divided court sub nom. Ruckleshaus
v. Sierra Club, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972). See generally Note, The Clean
Air Act and the Concept of Non-Degradation: Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 2
ECOLoGY L.Q. 801 (1972).
30. The concept of non-degradation is extremely controversial because of its
direct and substantial effect on the future economic growth of any particular
area. It is seen by some as an effective means of land use planning and by
others as an unwarranted obstacle to economic growth. See generally Mandelker
& Rothschild, The Role of Land-Use Controls in Combating Air Pollution Under
the Clean Air Act of 1970, 3 ECOLoGY L.Q. 235 (1973). EPA has proposed non-
degradation regulations which attempt to balance social and economic consid-
erations with environmental concerns. The essence of the proposed regulations,
which employ a three zone scheme, is that areas having clean air above the
national standards can decide for themselves, based upon their own analysis
of social and economic factors, how much deterioration they will allow, with the
national standard setting the maximum. One immediate question raised by these
proposed regulations is whether they are in conflict with the existing principle
of non-degradation. See 39 Fed. Reg. 31,000, 31,004 (1974). These regulations
were issued in final form in late 1974. See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510-17 (1974).
31. See note 23 supra.
32. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 88-112. Arguably, dispersion
enhancement is no longer a viable pollution control method due to the increased
contamination of the atmosphere which has reduced the absolute potential for
dilution. One of the major air pollution problems today is non-visible small
particles with high diffusion factors. Dispersal methods do not eliminate this
form of pollution, but rather contribute to it. Id. See also Stumph & Duprey,
19T5]
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strategy may result in an increase in pollution not only in the local area
but in adjacent regions as well, thus violating the principle of non-de-
gradation. s Overall, dispersion enhancement techniques are question-
able pollution control methods and should be used, as the court suggests,
only as a last resort.1s
In its third ruling, the Fifth Circuit held that the Administrator ex-
ceeded his powers in approving the Georgia statute 5 permitting consid-
eration of economic and technical factors in its implementation plan. 0
Trends in Air Pollution Control Legislation, in 1970 Senate Hearings, supra
note 3, at 396. This report discusses the inefficiency and limitations of dis-
persion enhancement and concludes that, given the number of variables involved
in this approach (geographical factors, meteorological factors, air stream pat-
terns, and production methods of individual polluters), its reliability is question-
able. Id. at 411.
33. See Brief for Petitioners at 28-29, NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir. 1974), for estimates of potential increases in pollution levels.
34. 489 F.2d at 407-08, 410. EPA has proposed several amendments to the
Clean Air Act which speak directly to the court's arguments. See 4 EN-
VIRONMENT RPTR. CURRENT DEv. 2004 (1974) (proposed legislation). The
proposed amendments would: (1) delete all reference to "emission standards"
in § 1857c-6 (new source standards) and § 1857c-7 (hazardous pollutants)
which had the effect of implying that emission limitation was the preferred
method, id. at 2005-06; (2) eliminate the non-degradation policy by inserting
a clause into the Act's statement of purpose, which reads, "but nothing in this
Act is intended to require or authorize the establishment by the Administrator
of standards more stringent than primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards," id. at 2010; (3) amend § 1857c-5 (state implementation plans)
by adding the following clause: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to
preclude use of alternative or intermittent control measures which the Admin-
istrator determines . . . will permit attainment and maintenance of the national
ambient air quality standards," id. The effect of the proposed amendments
would be to undercut drastically the legal argument against dispersion en-
hancement and to stimulate its use.
35. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-901 to -917 (1971), as amended, GA. CooE ANN.
§§ 88-903, -906, -906.1, -908, -909 (Supp. 1975). The statute's statement of
policy combines protection of the air with "providing for maximum employ-
ment and full industrial development of the State." Id. § 88-901 (1971). The
Act allows the Georgia Department of Public Health to consider the economic
feasibility of air cleaning devices, the effect of such devices on the efficiency
of industrial operation, the economic and industrial development of the State,
and other factors which the Department may find applicable. Id. § 88-906, as
amended, (Supp. 1975).
36. The vice in section 88-906 is ... [that] it is overinclusive. The pro-
vision does not distinguish between situations where cost and feasibility
considerations compete with other considerations and those where they do
not. It is, of course, appropriate ... to take into account cost and feasi-
bility factors in most circumstances; ...doing so is proscribed only when
those considerations are in conflict with considerations of public health.
[Vol. 10:297
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The Clean Air Amendments represent an ordering of social priorities.
Congress mandated that economic cost and technical feasibility are
always to be subordinate to public health considerations and are not to
be considered in meeting the deadline for attainment of the national
primary standard. 7 While current economic events may require a re-
examination of the existing priorities,"8 this should be made legislatively.
The majority of courts which have ruled on this question have agreed
489 F.2d at 412. See also Transcontinental Bus. Sys., Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d
466, 484 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1967) (discussing limits of
administrative discretion).
37. NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part
sub nom. Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). This view was recognized by
Senator Muskie when describing the philosophy of the 1970 amendment pending
before Congress.
The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of technological or
economic judgments-or even to be limited by what is or appears to be
technologically or economically feasible. Our responsibility is to establish
what the public interest requires to protect the health of persons. This may
mean that people and industries will be asked to do what seems to be
impossible at the present time. But if health is to be protected, these chal-
lenges must be met. I am convinced they can be met.
116 CONG. REc. 32,901-02 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie). See also S.
REP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 2-3. Congress decided to exclude economic
considerations while the Administration had favored setting standards derived
from the best available scientific knowledge. 1970 Senate Hearing, supra note
3, at 132. "Economic feasibility was included in the House bill, it was hotly
debated in conference and it was deleted." Implementation Hearings, supra
note 20, at 19 (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
38. Pressure to alter these priorities began soon after the Amendments were
passed. EPA, when it first proposed guidelines to assist states in developing
implementation plans on June 28, 1971, stated that economic considerations
were a "digression from the proper emphasis of the law." Yet when the final
guidelines were issued, they contained language encouraging states to consider
economic and cost benefit factors. The question of the inclusion of economic
factors was a main issue throughout the implementation hearings. See Implemen-
tation Hearings, supra note 20, at 3-25. Rising concern over energy, its cost and
availability has so dramatically added to this pressure that the effect on legis-
lation can now be seen. In 1974 Congress passed, and the President signed
into law, the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42
U.S.C.), which provides for mandatory and voluntary conversion from oil or
gas to coal for large fuel operators. Id. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 792 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Through an amendment to the Clean Air Act, the new legislation temporarily
suspends specific Clean Air Act requirements governing the use of coal, and
allows temporary extensions for some operators, as long as in the end such
action would not cause or contribute to the violation of the primary ambient
air quality standards. Id. § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10 (Supp. IV, 1974). See also
4 ENVIRONMENT RPTR. CURRENT DEv. 2004-10 (1974) for the proposed
amendments to the Clean Air Act which speak to economic considerations.
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that until Congress determines otherwise, economic considerations are
improper factors in state implementation planning. "
The Georgia plan also authorized the state environmental agency to
grant variances from the approved implementation plan when strict
compliance with the latter would be inappropriate, unreasonable or
unduly burdensome. 40 Petitioners asserted that the strict variance pro-
cedure provided in section 1857c-5(f) of the federal statute was to be
the exclusive mechanism for granting variances. 41
EPA disagreed and argued that section 1857c-5(f) was to apply only
when a variance would prevent the attainment or maintenance of the
national ambient air quality standards. 42 Implicit in EPA's argument is
the premise that any variance which does not jeopardize the attainment
of these standards is to be considered a revision, subject to the Admin-
istrator's approval under section 1857c-5(a) (3);" but not limited by
the strict requirements of section 1857c-5(f). 44 Alternatively, EPA also
argued that even if section 1857c-5(f) was an exclusive variance pro-
vision, it would only be exclusive in the post-attainment time period.
39. E.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975); NRDC
v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1973); NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d
875, 889 (1st Cir. 1973). Compare Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d
349, 359 (3d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), with Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1973).
40. GA. CoD ANN. § 88-912 (1971).
41. Brief for Petitioners at 13-14, NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1974). This section provides that a postponement of up to one year may be
granted by the Administrator of EPA upon his finding that: (1) a good faith
effort to comply has been made, (2) non-compliance is due to the unavail-
ability of either the necessary technology or the requisite alternative methods,
and (3) "the continued operation of such source is essential to the national
security or to the public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1) (1970).
The Commerce Department has proposed an amendment to the variance pro-
vision which would allow the Administrator to grant a variance of up to three
years and allow him to consider the added factors of fuel availability and
economic impact of compliance. 5 ENVIRONMENT RPTa. CURRENT Dzv. 1263,
1264 (1974).
42. 489 F.2d at 400.
43. Revisions (changes, alterations and improvements) to the implementation
plans are covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1974). The Administrator incorporated his view of the revision into the EPA
guidelines. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.6, 51.32 (1974).
44. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
45. Post-attainment refers to the period after the states meet the national
primary standard. In most cases this will be in mid-1975 (or 1977 with the
two year extension under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970)).
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EPA contended that before the attainment deadlines states were free
to grant variances by their own standards so long as the achievement of
the national ambient air standards were not threatened. The Fifth
Circuit, rejecting both of these arguments, held that section 1857c-5 (f)
was the exclusive mechanism for granting variances and that therefore
the Georgia variance provision was invalid."'
A wide split among the circuits47 has resulted from the dilemma over
which federal provision controls the granting of variances and at what
stage in the implementation process that provision applies. The First
Circuit, adopting EPA's alternative argument, held that section 1857c-
5(f) was exclusive only in the post-attainment time period.48 The Ninth
Circuit, however, rejected this distinction and ruled that a state could
grant a variance at any time, providing the attainment and maintenance
of the national ambient air quality standards were not threatened. 49 Both
of these decisions were based on a perception of inherent flexibility 0
46. 489 F.2d at 401-03.
47. NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d
519 (2d Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974); NRDC v.
EPA, 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973); NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st
Cir. 1973).
48. NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 888 (1st Cir. 1973). Accord, NRDC v.
EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 523-25 (2d Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690,
693-94 (8th Cir. 1973); see Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean
Air v. District of Columbia, 373 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (D.D.C. 1974); Dela-
ware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040,
1044 (D. Del. 1973). Upon investigation the First Circuit's pre/post distinction
is found to be without legislative support. Neither the 1970 Amendments nor
their legislative history make any reference to such a distinction. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857-58a (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); S. REP. No. 1196,
supra note 2; H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 1970 Senate
Hearings, supra note 3. Moreover, the reasoning itself is faulty. The Firit
Circuit stated that if the variance scheme allowed during pre-attainment period
was also allowed during a post-attainment period, "endless delay" over whether
the variance would interfere with the attainment of the national standard
would result. 478 F.2d at 886. The court, however, provides no substantial
assurances that the undesirable results it predicts would happen during the
post-attainment period would not also occur in the more critical pre-attainment
period. EPA's recently proposed regulations adopt the First Circuit's holding
approving limited federal preemption. See 39 Fed. Reg. 34,572-74 (1974).
49. NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 1974).
50. These courts read the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (i)
(1970), which says that states must meet the national air quality standards
"as expeditiously as practicable" but no later than three years after their im-
plementation plan has been approved, as indicative of Congressional intent to
allow flexibility in the granting of variances. NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 912
1976]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
within the Clean Air Amendments rather than on the specific statutory
argument advanced by EPA. In fact, all five of the circuits which re-
viewed this question specifically rejected EPA's application of the re-
vision section to the granting of variances."
In Train v. NRDC,5 2 the Supreme Court resolved this conflict, adopt-
ing EPA's interpretation that the revision mechanism of section 1857c-
5(a) (3) controls the granting of variances. The Court stated that, "With-
out going so far as to hold that the Agency's construction of the Act
was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we conclude that it
was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it should have been
accepted by the reviewing courts." 8 While it is true that this issue does
not admit an "easy answer,"5 4 a thorough examination of the statute,
its legislative history, and its control strategy demonstrates that the Su-
preme Court erred.
A basic theme underlying the Court's decision was that EPA should
be accorded considerable discretion in construing a statute which falls
within its expertise.5 While this is true in general, the precise degree
of such discretion is determined by the specific statute in question. In
the case of the Clean Air Amendments the administrator's discretionary
powers were severely limited. The Amendments were designed to correct
the unaggressive nature of the federal agency itself., To achieve this,
Congress wrote stringent administrative standards and procedures into
the Clean Air Amendments,5 7 delegating great power to EPA to enforce
the Amendments but little power to alter or defer from them. 8 Given
(9th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 887 (1st Cir. 1973). The
problem with this reasoning is that the language stands for just the opposite
proposition. Flexibility was expressly written out of this section of the statute. See
notes 7, 27 supra & note 67 infra. See also 1970 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra
note 3, at 1502 (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
51. See cases cited note 47 supra.
52. 421 U.S. 60 (1975), rev'g in part NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 75.
54. Id.
55. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
57. See notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra.
58. "The committee will be available to sit. The companies would be in
a position to make their case. If Congress, which would have made the policy
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these strict guidelines on administrative action, the Supreme Court erred
in the excessive deference it gave to the agency's position in this case.
Even granting a reasonable degree of administrative discretion, the
Supreme Court's adoption of EPA's construction of the Amendments
is not supported by either the statute or its legislative history. In its
holding the Supreme Court relied heavily upon a portion of the Senate
Report which states: "If a Governor judges that any region . . . or
portions thereof within his State will not meet the national ambient air
quality standards within the time provided, [section 1857c-5(f)] would
authorize him ... to file a petition... for relief."'59 From this statement
the Court reasoned that section 1857c-5(f) is applicable only when the
national ambient air quality standards are threatened.6 The weakness
in the Court's reasoning is that it has examined this portion of the legis-
lative history in a vacuum, ignoring the other relevant portions of the
legislative history6' and the "plain meaning" of the statute itself. Sec-
tion 1857c-5(f) specifically states that it is applicable when "any station-
ary source" seeks a postponement from "any requirement of an applicable
implementation plan."'' - Moreover, neither the wording nor the place-
ment of the revision section implies that it is to be used in any manner
in the first instance, is persuaded that the industry cannot do the job, Congress
could change the policy." 116 Co-NG. Rac. 32,905 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Muskie). See also notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
59. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 14-15 (emphasis added). The Court
also felt that the relationship between § 1857c-5(f) and § 1857c-5(e) (ex-
tension of time for application of implementation plan itself, granted only
at time of submission of such plans) supported its conclusion. 421 U.S. at 83-87.
60. 421 U.S. at 84.
61. See 1970 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 3, at 1502 (remarks of Sen-
ator Eagleton); notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970) (emphasis added). The Court's response
to this language was that it "serves only to define the matters with respect to
which the governor of a State may apply for a postponement. The language
does not, as the Fifth Circuit would have it, state that all sources desirous of any
form of relief must rely solely on the postponement provision." 421 U.S. at 88.
Under the Court's interpretation, variances which do not threaten the national
standards may be handled in either of two ways. A Governor may seek relief
under the strict federal standards of § 1857c-5(f) or the relevant state statute
can be applied. This is a strained construction of words which are plain in
their meaning. First, it is inconsistent with the Amendments' control strategy, see
notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra. Secondly, the word "may" in the
statute refers to the Governor's power of discretion to seek a variance in the
first place, not the level at which it is going to be sought. Finally, the statute
says nothing about attainment and maintenance of national standards; it spe-
cifically states "any requirement." 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970).
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connected with the granting of variances.03 On the contrary, the re-
vision provision refers to changes in the implementation plan itself, not
to variances by the individual polluters.
Most importantly, EPA's interpretation directly conflicts with the
enforcement scheme devised by Congress. This scheme is designed to
pressure states to establish their own aggressive enforcement programs,"
rectifying the passive situation existing prior to the 1970 Amendments."
Mandatory state implementation plans 0 for meeting national standards
in accordance with strict timetables 7 are critical components of this en-
forcement program. Requests for variances from enforcement plans and
63. The revision section is placed immediately after, and refers to, the initial
requirements for state implementation plans, § 1857c-(5)(a)(2), which are the
standards by which any revision is to be judged. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3)
(1970). Moreover, the statute specified that the revision section supplements
the implementation as a whole when the statute defines an applicable imple-
mentation plan as "the implementation, or most recent revision thereof." Id.
§ 1857c-5(d). For added support for this argument see Metropolitan Wash-
ington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 373 F. Supp. 1089,
1094 (D.D.C. 1974); S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 14.
64. The Fifth Circuit recognized the purpose of this enforcement scheme:
"[Tihe plan of the statute was to secure ambitious commitments at the planning
stage, and then, by making it difficult to depart from those commitments, to
assure that departures would be made only in cases of real need." NRDC v.
EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 403 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part sub nom. Train v.
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
65. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
66. See S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 11-12; Implementation Hearings,
supra note 20, at 226 (remarks of William Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator).
These sources stress the critical role the implementation plans play in the
enforcement scheme.
67. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. Congress, in establishing firm
deadlines rejected both the Administration's bill, S. 3466, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), reprinted in 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 26-46, and the
House's bill, H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which did not establish
deadlines, but provided that the national standards were to be met within a "rea-
sonable time." See note 27 supra. The importance of strict attainment of these
deadlines is dramatically demonstrated in a draft of a report to the Federal
Power Commission. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, POWER GENERATION: CON-
SERVATION, HEALTH, AND FUEL SUPPLY, A REPORT TO THE TASK FORCE ON
CONSERVATION AND FUEL SUPPLY TECHNICAL ADVISORY Colsia. ON CONSERVA-
TION OF ENERGY (National Power Survey 1973). The report points out that
failure to meet primary national standards for sulfur (the main pollutant of
power plants) by the 1975 deadline would result in approximately 25,000 or
more premature deaths in this country between 1975 and 1980.
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deadlines are to be carefully scrutinized"' and granted only as a "last
alternative."9
Under EPA's interpretation, the essential purpose of this scheme-the
achievement of "air quality standards protective of the health of per-
sons"T70 within the assigned deadlines-is defeated because EPA has
chosen not to recognize the cumulative effect of pollution. The granting
of one variance may not lead to frustration of the national standards;
the cumulative effect of several variances quite possibly could. Given the
difficulty of tracing emissions to any one source when dealing with urban
areas,71 it is impossible to predict if and when a single variance will exceed
the national standards. Thus, the end result will be that while no one
source will have been found to frustrate the national standards, they will
nevertheless have been frustrated.
In NRDC v. EPA7" the court of appeals upheld the intricate enforce-
ment scheme woven into the Clean Air Amendments when it held that:
(1) public access to emission data cannot be blocked by state trade secret
provisions; (2) dispersal techniques are inadequate primary control
strategies as stipulated by the Clean Air Amendments; (3) economic
impact and technical feasibility are improper considerations in formu-
lating implementation plans; and (4) the federal variance procedure
preempts any state procedure at all times. The Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit on the issue of variances and ruled that under section
1857c-5 (a) (3) a state may grant a variance by whatever standards it
chooses, providing the national ambient air standards are not threat-
ened.7
3
The significance of these holdings goes well beyond the individual
merits of each issue. Implicit in the Clean Air Amendments is a dual
68. See notes 8, 41 and accompanying text supra.
69. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 2, at 15. The Senate Report provides that
extensions are to be granted only if essential to the public interest and general
welfare of the people in that region. Id. The report also states that the pressure
of deadlines is to be met by federal participation in the form of staff and
funds rather than by extensions of deadlines. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 2.
71. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 397; see also 39 Fed. Reg. 31,000,
31,003 (1974).
72. 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part sub nora. Train v. NRDC,
421 U.S. 60 (1975).
73. Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 98-99 (1975).
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delegation. Accompanying the immense power delegated to EPA was
an equal degree of responsibility as to its use. The Fifth Circuit rec-
ognized this when it refused to allow EPA to foresake its responsibility.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Fifth Circuit on the issue of vari-
ances, did not.
James N. Cahan
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